To explain a bit, I'm comparing it to the notion that "US has talked like a liberal but acted like a realist" on both sides of the unipolar moment.
We are able to state that Ukraine should be able to choose their alliances, while pressuring the distant Solomon Islands to prevent them hosting a Chinese millitary base.
To explain a bit, I'm comparing it to the notion that "US has talked like a liberal but acted like a realist" on both sides of the unipolar moment.
We are able to state that Ukraine should be able to choose their alliances, while pressuring the distant Solomon Islands to prevent them hosting a Chinese millitary base.
I think those in the blob rationalize the inconsistency into something that makes sense to them. Most likely: "we are the good guys".
I'm not knowledgeable enough to respond about that specific, but I think the crux of the matter is whether or not the U.S. has been behaving as realists would predict since 2017. I concur that they are, yet they dismiss realist behavior in all other contexts and pretend it no longer exists. There is a sort of sickness about that. For if the blob truly believes that there is a new global order that is not realist they are going to overreact when other nations do entirely predictable things. A very dangerous way to conduct foreign policy.
I do agree with your proposition that people/countries decide what they want to do and then back into the reasons later but rules do constrain us. It's not a wide-open, anything-goes world. It's a mix and overreactions are common. Unfortunately, you can't know if it is an overreaction until long after the fact most of the time.
We talk about "rules based order" a lot, but what is an example where rules have constrained the United States from something it believed it needed to do for national security reasons?
Could have made life so painful for Afghanistan's people that they feared choosing the Taliban. It would have been easy to support the Northern Alliance, who would have done the dirty work in much the same way the Baathists did in Iraq. I provide that as an example, but I think it was viewed as being in our national interests to treat the Afghani and Iraqis reasonably well following the invasions. In Afghanistan's case, they ultimately chose the Taliban, and as long as they don't send terrorists our way, we don't care. We even send aid and will send a lot more, assuming they treat their people in a fashion we find a little less objectionable.
Wanted to add that the USSR behaved the same way as the US did in Afghanistan. That, along with the fact that Putin has not gone "Total Stalin" in Ukraine, gives me some hope that things can be worked out. I agree with Dr. Mershheimer that the ultimate outcome is probably a Ukrainian rump state but as long as they hold on to Odessa, I think, but don't know, that it would be a tolerable outcome. Does that make any sense?
To explain a bit, I'm comparing it to the notion that "US has talked like a liberal but acted like a realist" on both sides of the unipolar moment.
We are able to state that Ukraine should be able to choose their alliances, while pressuring the distant Solomon Islands to prevent them hosting a Chinese millitary base.
I think those in the blob rationalize the inconsistency into something that makes sense to them. Most likely: "we are the good guys".
That’s exactly right and, sadly, about as sophisticated an analysis as the blob appears to be capable of.
No one attains perfection in this world. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 was clearly illegal but who isn't glad it happened?
I'm not knowledgeable enough to respond about that specific, but I think the crux of the matter is whether or not the U.S. has been behaving as realists would predict since 2017. I concur that they are, yet they dismiss realist behavior in all other contexts and pretend it no longer exists. There is a sort of sickness about that. For if the blob truly believes that there is a new global order that is not realist they are going to overreact when other nations do entirely predictable things. A very dangerous way to conduct foreign policy.
I do agree with your proposition that people/countries decide what they want to do and then back into the reasons later but rules do constrain us. It's not a wide-open, anything-goes world. It's a mix and overreactions are common. Unfortunately, you can't know if it is an overreaction until long after the fact most of the time.
We talk about "rules based order" a lot, but what is an example where rules have constrained the United States from something it believed it needed to do for national security reasons?
Could have made life so painful for Afghanistan's people that they feared choosing the Taliban. It would have been easy to support the Northern Alliance, who would have done the dirty work in much the same way the Baathists did in Iraq. I provide that as an example, but I think it was viewed as being in our national interests to treat the Afghani and Iraqis reasonably well following the invasions. In Afghanistan's case, they ultimately chose the Taliban, and as long as they don't send terrorists our way, we don't care. We even send aid and will send a lot more, assuming they treat their people in a fashion we find a little less objectionable.
Wanted to add that the USSR behaved the same way as the US did in Afghanistan. That, along with the fact that Putin has not gone "Total Stalin" in Ukraine, gives me some hope that things can be worked out. I agree with Dr. Mershheimer that the ultimate outcome is probably a Ukrainian rump state but as long as they hold on to Odessa, I think, but don't know, that it would be a tolerable outcome. Does that make any sense?